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Contemporary cultural texts point towards the acknowledgment of com-
plicity as a starting point for engagement with Others, with the world, 
readers, and histories that energize them.1 Here I discuss the critical role 
that complicity (both as an act and as a concept) plays in drawing out 
the complex interrelationships between historical pasts and present. In 
terms of critique, the charge of complicity operates very powerfully as a 
critical accusation aimed at defeating the convictions of an unknowing 
text, and as such it has much in common with a deconstructive reading 
(Critchley).  e issues of complicity is increasingly embedded in cul-
tural texts that are curious about the signifi cance of being complicit and 
complicity-as-being, and therefore might answer “yes, and” to the accu-
sation of complicity.2 Given this, it is important to not only “diagnose” 
complicity but also to rethink complicity as a methodology, as a practice 
and theory of ethical engagement with others and in relation to present 
encounters with the past. 
Cultural texts, including fi lm and literature, are useful for exploring 
the possibilities of complicity because they often pivot on representa-
tions which include the question of representation—the ethics, poli-
tics, and history of giving and taking account of others. Kate Grenville’s 
 e Secret River (2005), Kim Scott and Hazel Brown’s Kayang and Me 
(2005), and the fi lm Jindabyne (Ray Laurence 2006) contain diff erent 
accounts of what complicity might mean, but each presents it as an im-
portant consideration of what it means to live with history and in con-
nection with Others. In placing these Australian texts alongside readings 
of complicity from literature, law and philosophy I hope to shift critical 
vocabulary away from seemingly straightforward accounts of resistance 
and domination towards a more tangled sideways reading of complicity 
as a condition of relations and encounters between Others. 
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 e last decade in Australia has seen discussions about guilt, shame3 
and responsibility4 as central to the issue of reconciliation (itself a term 
which rose to prominence in the early 1990s) between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal Australians. Given the predominance of these terms, the 
question of complicity as methodology or as a better term for describ-
ing responsibility requires attention. In the 1990s, discussions of guilt 
in Australia stalled largely on a question of its cathartic productivity (as 
if quantifi able as part of our gross national product). In his now famous 
“Redfern Speech” (1992), Prime Minister Paul Keating said that guilt 
was “not a very constructive emotion” (n.pag). Keating’s speech was the 
closest that the Federal Australian Government came to saying “sorry” 
for the events of colonization, just as many other leaders around the 
world also made public statements apologizing for national traumas, 
like Clinton apologizing for slavery in the United States of America. It 
was a speech that called on Australians to recognize the violence of colo-
nization, dispossession, and child stealing, and the still-present legacies 
of those acts.  e radicalism of Keating’s speech, and the ways it was 
met with accusations of a so called “black armband view” of Australian 
history, stems from Keating’s call for white Australians (in particular) to 
own their part in the violence.5 Keating points out “the problem starts 
with us non-Aboriginal Australians.” He goes on to call for the recogni-
tion of historical truths: that it “was we who did the dispossessing. We 
took the traditional lands and then smashed the traditional way of life. 
We brought the disasters.  e alcohol. We committed the murders. We 
took the children from their mothers. We practised discrimination and 
exclusion.” Keating conjures up the image of the Aboriginal Australian 
as the “poor” Australian, asking whites to “to reach back for the poor 
and dispossessed” remembering that Australia did provide for “the dis-
possessed Irish” and the “poor of Britain.” Keating also invites the lis-
tener to imagine “how would I feel if this were done to me?” 
While Keating rejected guilt as not a “constructive emotion,” for 
others guilt was central to taking responsibility for the past. Raymond 
Gaita argues that the fact that we cannot entertain the possibility of 
putting people on trial for crimes against Aboriginal people means that 
we have failed to realize the extent of that crime itself: “How can one 
67
C om p l i c i t y,  Cr i t i que ,  a nd  Me t hodo logy
say that genocide had been committed, yet only ask for an apology 
and compensation? How can you think genocide always to be a serious 
crime, yet fi nd it unthinkable to call for criminal proceedings?” (44). 
Richard Mulgan’s discussion of apology and reconciliation situates guilt 
as necessary for the legitimacy of the Australian State. He says that, “acts 
of atonement and apology all require for their satisfactory completion 
that the injured party accept the admission of guilt as in some sense 
wiping the slate clean and marking a new start. Only then can guilt be 
left behind” (189). Mulgan’s search for non-Aboriginal legitimacy seeks 
expiation, a washing away, a clean slate, a critical distance between then 
and now: “ e moral horror of the colonial past can only be squarely 
faced if a moral distance is interposed between the colonisers, who are 
condemned, and their descendants, who condemn and are thereby 
exonerated” (192). If this is how guilt and apology operates then it seems 
not able to account for present injustice, continuing injustice. Something 
other than that which can be contained or wiped away must therefore 
be active. 
In Australian debates on responsibility and reconciliation there is also 
an emphasis on the productive nature of shame. But this too can be 
contained and confi ned teleologically to past actions. In her critique 
of how quickly the Australian Nation was moved from shame to pride, 
Sara Ahmed points out that “Shame may be restorative only when the 
shamed other can ‘show’ that its failure to measure up to a social ideal is 
temporary” (emphasis original 107) and that within shame “the transfer-
ence of bad feeling to the subject in shame . . . can become evidence of 
the restoration of an identity of which we can be proud” (109–10).  at 
is, shame can allow the subject to recognize “bad feeling” in relation to 
the past but then this can be “balanced” by positive, restorative feelings, 
such as that called for by John Howard’s “Speech on Reconciliation” 
(1997). Research based on public opinion surveys gathered together by 
Goot and Rowse suggests that the majority of Australians have no prob-
lem in recognizing past injustice, dispossession and violence (154), but 
the main points of dispute relate to who and what is responsible and 
what forms that responsibility should take. For example, questions of 
form include asking whether responsibility should be undertaken in a 
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combination of broadly defi ned Aboriginal complaints, or whether it 
should be enacted by government initiatives.  is debate suggests that 
it is not so much a matter of telling the history of dispossession and 
violence of the past in order to achieve contemporary reconciliation. 
Rather, the focus of these debates should be on formulating what re-
sponsibility might look like today.  e emphasis on guilt and shame 
can have a foreshortening eff ect on historical responsibility, critical in-
sight, and a critical vocabulary. Guilt, shame, and complicity are meas-
ured by the extent of their reach, but important diff erences appear.  e 
diff erence is in the structural relations that they connote: whereas guilt 
and shame are vertical, individualized and deep, complicity is horizontal 
with pervasive breadth—as in a network.  e former suggests a chrono-
logical relation through time; the latter a condition of being across time 
itself. Complicity, rather than guilt and shame, describes the network in 
which Australians are located: a settler colonial state. Colonialism is a 
structure that reproduces complicity in oppression, rather than merely 
an event, as Wolfe observes, to which guilt and shame may be confi ned. 
In accounts of white privilege and responsibility, the idea of “structure” 
often surfaces. For instance, Anna Haebich concludes in relation to the 
Stolen Generations that: “in response to the question: ‘Who was re-
sponsible?’ there is the indelible impression of generalised white com-
plicity at all levels, so that it seems naïve in the extreme to point the 
‘accusing fi nger’ solely at government” (287). In her critique of white 
privilege and Australian feminism, Talkin’ Up to the White Woman, 
Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues: “white race privilege, in Australia 
and elsewhere, is structurally located and it determines the life chances 
of white and non-white people every day” (52 emphasis added). Janna 
 ompson argues that injustice (and implicitly also privilege) is trans-
mitted along “family lines” (52), reproduced across generations, through 
time. Guilt and shame suggest more of an exceptional, one-off  act of in-
dividual that occasions a holding to account. Complicity is a structural 
relationship that cannot be expiated fully because it exists in multiple, 
networked forms. Moreover, I would argue that it also explains, in part, 
why contradictory ideas about social justice (such as those identifi ed 
in opinion polls discussed by Goot and Rowse) can be held simultane-
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ously by Australians who are “divided,” not just from each other, but 
also “in their own minds” (171). Complicity highlights the complex 
involvement of individuals at multiple and connected levels of com-
munity, government, and kinship. Seemingly contradictory ideas about 
responsibility and social justice are embedded in the idea of complic-
ity. Complicity connects us to others, ideas, structures, and not least 
of all that which we might hope to keep at a distance through critique, 
through the distance of time, and through apology. 
Complicity is commonly recognized as a legal status that draws indi-
vidual responsibility into line with others or a collective (Kutz 176). It 
connotes juridical culpability but is also used in the sense of “answer-
ability” and “response-ability” (Oliver 7), rather than guilt for direct 
actions.  e term has both negative associations and means negative 
associations. In cultural critique these include the observations that 
postcolonial critics are complicit with global capitalism (Ahmad 364); 
feminists are complicit with patriarchy (Grosz 342) and that white 
feminists are complicit with white domination (Moreton-Robinson 
11). Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem:  e Banality of Evil situ-
ates complicity as a feature of modernity itself: “complicity is not de-
termined by a relation to law but is a moral criterion of judgement” 
(293). She fi nds contemporary Western subjects in danger of failing 
to exercise independent moral decisions and judgements in relation to 
others: “his [Eichmann’s] inability to speak was closely connected with 
an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of some-
body else” (49). Her defi nition of thoughtlessness is closely linked to 
complicity, as well as the sense that the western subject is no longer in 
command of his own deeds.6 Such thoughtlessness might be a factor in 
relation to Goot and Rowse’s observations, based on Donovan’s opin-
ion poll, that a high proportion of Australians “cared too little about 
reconciliation to express a view on it” (168). Arendt’s work situates 
complicity as something that one can escape through the moral im-
perative of the spectator who can judge (56, 63). In Arendt’s reading 
the judging spectator is always evaluating critically and is therefore not 
complicit. Here it is critique itself that saves the spectator from com-
plicity with evil, an assumption that does not always hold true. In a 
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popular use, critics deploy the term complicity in order to distinguish a 
grey zone from their own black or white side. In these instances, com-
plicity is used as a kind of charge or accusation that is meant to shift 
the critic over to the so-called other side, where they are as bad as the 
thing that they critique. In this sense, it traditionally operates as a criti-
cal trump card, delivered by the critic as they stand somehow outside 
the game that they have triumphed over. But in some senses complicity 
no longer works as a critical trump card. It situates the critic as just an-
other player, her cards being signs of her membership of a community 
of players all diff erent winners, losers, witnesses, bystanders, partici-
pants linked by the possibility of utilizing “responsibility-in-complic-
ity” (Sanders 12), but not necessarily the political motivation to take 
their own complicity into account. 
More recent readings of complicity and diff erent understandings of 
the role of critique suggest that its very usefulness as a term is that it 
draws on the inter-subjective nature of being in relation to Others. In 
 e Gift of Death, Derrida suggests that avoiding complicity is impos-
sible and that the point is to try to avoid the worst: 
I am responsible to the other as other, I answer to him, and I 
answer for what I do before him. But of course, what binds me 
thus in my singularity to the absolute singularity of the other, 
immediately propels me into the space or risk of absolute sac-
rifi ce.  ere are also others, an infi nite number of them, the 
innumerable generality of others to whom I should be bound 
by the same responsibility, a general and universal responsibil-
ity. (68)
Structural positions eff ect the capacity to “do justice” (Butler 621) to 
Others (but not all Others, in their infi nite proliferation, see above), and 
the inability to bracket complicity in relation to particular actions like 
performing critique means that recognition of complicity is an always 
already condition of our responsibility to others. Complicity, in this 
sense, forms the grounds for ethical engagement. Within postcolonial 
studies, Gayatri Spivak indicates that it is also a position that has yet to 
be fully realized “in order to act” in a resistant and “response-able” way 
71
C om p l i c i t y,  Cr i t i que ,  a nd  Me t hodo logy
(370). Complicity highlights the individual’s proximity to the problems 
of colonialism in this case, rather than separation from it.
In his study of the relationship between South African intellectuals 
and apartheid, Mark Sanders argues that complicity means, “not wash-
ing one’s hands but actively affi  rming a complicity, or a potential com-
plicity, in the ‘outrageous deeds’ of others. Once cultivated, this sense of 
responsibility would, in the best possible worlds, make one act to stop or 
prevent those deeds” (3–4). Taking his cue from the discussion of moral 
responsibility in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which in-
troduced the term “little perpetrator,” Sanders points out that the “pro-
jection of complicity through an owning of the ‘little perpetrator’ is, 
however, the ethico-political response available to anyone” (4). His read-
ing of complicity in the work of South African intellectuals fi nds that 
complicity represents a “foldedness” with Others:
Whenever justice is invoked, as it always is, in the name of a 
specifi c cause, there will be the risk of doing injustice.  is 
aporia imposes itself not only when the intellectual assumes 
a notional complicity with the perpetrator of crimes but also 
when he or she affi  rms a ‘foldedness’ in human-being when 
particular loyalties threaten to bar the general realization of 
that foldedness. (6)
Sanders found in his study of the intellectual and apartheid a paradox 
that “while supporters [of apartheid] disavowed or sought to limit fold-
edness with the other, opponents, though striving to minimise acting-
in-complicity with the agents of apartheid and its policies, tended to 
acknowledge, affi  rm, and generalize responsibility in complicity” (9). 
 at is, in order to contextualise responsibility it was necessary to ac-
knowledge complicity, a proximity rather a distance to the thing that is 
opposed: “opposition takes its fi rst steps from a footing of complicity” 
(Sanders 9). 
Accounting for legal accountability in actions that “fall outside the 
paradigm of individual, intentional wrongdoing” (1), Christopher 
Kutz argues that turning to complicity is a way of dealing with shifts 
in structures of collective work life, business and legal networks, all 
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of which challenge atomistic versions of autonomy and agency. Kutz 
argues, “with respect to the collective harms that threaten our global 
age, all individual actions are essentially insignifi cant” (15). He argues 
that while it might “seem odd to turn for help to the counterideal 
of complicity,” he fi nds that complicity “teaches us what it means to 
act together, when acting together goes badly” and that the “hidden 
promise of complicity is the conception of community upon which it 
draws: a world where individuals shape their lives with others, in love 
mixed with resentment, and in cooperation mixed with discord. Such 
a world is no utopia, which suggests that it can be made real” (259). 
Guilt and expiation, proverbially washing one’s hands by pointing an 
accusing fi nger—these are utopian, and do not consider how we are 
all touched diff erently by complicity.  ese diff erences are important 
and while complicity may draw on a community it is crucial to stress 
that this community raises the question of community itself, deferring 
it, or at least rendering it a “fractured community,” as Linnell Secomb 
describes. In other words, complicities are not equivalent; being com-
plicit as a colonizer, as migrant, as Aboriginal, as man, woman, queer, 
classed, these are all diff erently negotiated and mobilized. For instance, 
Kim Scott’s consideration of his descendant’s complicity has diff erent 
political meanings to the complicity considered by Cassandra Pybus 
in Community of  ieves (1991). Both, however, situate complicity in 
terms of response-ability. 
Kate Grenville’s portrait of Australian settler culture in  e Secret River 
(2005) draws on complicity to contextualize its critique of that culture. 
Its account of William  ornhill and his wife Sal draws an image of 
how complicity with historical injustice lies at the heart of the domes-
tic, the familial and the everyday. In the Hawkesbury Region of New 
South Wales, William  ornhill participates in a massacre of Aboriginal 
people whom he believes are responsible for the death of a neighbour. 
 ornhill’s participation, consent, and apparent free will are represented 
in paradoxical terms where at fi rst there is the banal evil group: “the men 
closed in around him and there was a sound of agreement from many 
throats. It was not the voice of any one man but the voice of the group, 
faceless and powerful” (297).  ornhill’s participation is then individu-
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alized agency, the reader is told, “he was choosing it, of his own free 
will” (301). At the massacre site,  ornhill is lucid and paralyzed by the 
horror of what occurs and this expresses itself in the failure of his fi ngers 
to do what is ordered of them: “he was aware of issuing orders to his 
fi nger to pull back on the trigger, but nothing happened” (307). While 
 ornhill appears split between himself and the group of men “closed 
in around him,” he is also split in relation to his non-responding hands 
and his mind’s witness.  e simultaneity of this apparently individual-
ised agency within the collective highlights the shifting/shifty nature of 
complicity.
In the novel gender and race intersect in complicitous relationships. 
Sal, the white wife of William  ornhill, expresses the disquiet of the 
accomplice: “I hope you ain’t done nothing, she said at last. On account 
of me pushing at you” (emphasis original 323).  at is precisely the jus-
tifi cation that motivates him to join the throng of white men who were 
bristling for revenge attacks: “unless the blacks were settled, Sal would 
leave  ornhill’s Point. It was as stark as that” (298). Sal’s response to 
Will is for him to expiate the guilt, without acknowledging what it was 
that he had done, “here Will, give your hands a wash, she said. Her 
voice was ordinary enough, but she would not look into his face” (323). 
What remains is unspoken between them, his guilt and her complicity 
now form the grounds of their shared history.  e reader learns, “what-
ever the shadow was that lived with them, it did not belong just to him, 
but to her as well: it was a space they both inhabited. But it seemed that 
there was no way to speak into that silent place.  eir lives had slowly 
grown around it, the way the roots of a river-fi g grew around a rock” 
(324–25).  e washing-of-hands does not provide any expiation; his 
guilt seems only one half of the story when the whole domestic scene is 
constructed around the dispersal of the murdered.  e complicity of Sal 
and her refusal to acknowledge the massacre in favour of being-at-home 
marks the grounds of her responsibility as central to her “at-home-ness.” 
Grenville draws this image of complicity as the routine, banal evil that 
Arendt identifi es as contemporary society’s trap. It also fi gures as the 
“failed historicity” of postcoloniality (Ahmad 10), a past that is not, 
cannot, be fully breached.
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Jindabyne (2006) is similarly structured along gender and racial lines. 
Based on the Raymond Carver short story, “So much water so close to 
home,” this fi lm details the consequences to three white men who, not 
wishing to interrupt their fi shing trip, do not report fi nding the body 
of a murder victim. In Jindabyne, the murdered woman is Aboriginal 
and the ramifi cations of the men’s inability to respond with a sense of 
urgency or outrage appeals to the great silence of the domestic/national 
scene (as in  e Secret River) over colonial violence.  e local newspa-
pers report the men’s delay in reporting the crime and the men them-
selves become the subject of intense scrutiny.  e words “white hate 
crime” are scrawled across the garage where Stewart works.  e police-
man points out the stupidity of their actions but does not prosecute, 
choosing instead to merely shame them in his offi  ce. Kane’s reaction is 
to protest that it was not him that murdered the girl, as if that consti-
tutes the limit of his responsibility.  e fi lm focuses on Kane’s wife, a 
white woman Claire played by Laura Linney, and her attempts to make 
sense of her husband’s seeming lack of reaction to the violence. She at-
tempts to make amends for her husband’s complicity and her own, for 
through her association with him she too is implicated. Claire seeks out 
an acknowledgement of that complicity, to make him good again, and 
to make the recent lapse seem a temporary, individual moment of trans-
gression, though the chilling nature of his silence and moral torpor that 
allows it, suggests that it is not so easily confi ned to a single event as 
much as a structure of silence, non-recognition. Two of the men evade 
blame by arguing that they are simply being scapegoats for the real 
murderer. Another simply leaves town with his family. Rocco punches 
Stewart in defence of his own Aboriginal girlfriend, a punch that might 
be read as an attempt to break free of his association with Stewart and 
the “white hate crime” that joins them. Claire visits the Aboriginal rela-
tives of Susan, the murdered girl, tries to raise money for her funeral, 
attends the funeral, and fi nally convinces the white men to do so also. 
While it appears that their attendance at the funeral and their apology 
brings them relief (they are reunited), their presence is received in diff er-
ent and opposing ways by Susan’s relatives and friends.  eir presence 
relieves the whites from a crushing affi  liation with the murderer and 
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white hate crimes, but it leaves the question of ongoing responsibility 
open. It defers expiation, a moving forward into pride.  is indicates 
that where complicity is concerned there is always a question as to how 
responsibility can be “taken” and who measures it.  is is because an ac-
count of “our” responsibility is never “ours” alone (Probyn 39). 
In both these texts, Jindabyne and  e Secret River, the complicity of 
white Australian women is signifi cant. It substantiates the points raised 
by Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s critique of white women in relation to 
Australian discourses of race and gender; white women are complicit in 
maintaining blindness to racial privileges attached to whiteness. Moreton-
Robinson links the complicity of white women in Australian imperi-
alism to the shape of contemporary Australian feminism. She states, 
“white feminists benefi t today from the historical events that shaped 
and continue to shape the nature of power relations between them and 
indigenous women” (69). While I agree with most of the points that her 
reading raises, I take a diff erent view of their/our complicity and what 
comes of it. In her assessment of white feminist academics who teach 
about race and cultural diff erence in Australia, including critical white-
ness studies, Moreton-Robinson writes, “there is no imperative for them 
to acknowledge, own and change their complicity in racial domination” 
(148). Rather than there being no imperative, I argue that the impera-
tive is the recognition of complicity.  at is, awareness of complicity is, 
can be, the very starting point of white feminist engagement with racial 
domination. At the launch of Moreton-Robinson’s Whitening Race in 
August 2005, Wendy Brady raised the issue of complicity as that which 
colonialism wants in its white settlers—it wants us to become complicit 
with it. In other words, the failure of our interventions, our resistance 
and rupture is something which colonialism seeks. But if complicity 
is structural as well as a matter of individual intentions, then it is not 
something that can be easily sidestepped. If it is thought of in terms of 
a condition of response-ability then it is also not a matter of avoiding it, 
but speaking it, as Moreton-Robinson and Brady’s work suggests, and 
Sanders, Spivak, and Derrida also suggest. White feminist responses to 
complicity are varied.  ere is outright rejection, desertion of a fraught 
fi eld of inquiry, a refocusing on cultures of masculinity, as well as confes-
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sions and inquiries into whiteness and racism itself, where the writer ef-
fectively owns this history personally, biographically, and politically. All 
of these responses tell us something about the nature of complicity and 
its capacity to drive intellectual work and relationships with others. My 
response here is to think through what might be salvaged from complic-
ity, how it conditions responsibility.  is is, as I hope to have shown, a 
response to thinking about complicity not simply as something to con-
fess in the hope of expiating, moving then to pride, but as a structural 
aspect of the continuing eff ects of living in a settler colonial country like 
Australia.
Kim Scott and Hazel Brown’s Kayang and Me (2005) raises the ques-
tion of what to do with ancestors who helped the whites and imprisoned 
their own people, in this case other Noongars in Western Australia. 
Brown is an elder of the Wilomen Noogar of Australia’s West Coast. 
She is also Scott’s auntie, or Kayang.  e book is based on what Hazel-
Kayang [Hazel-auntie] has told Scott about their family history. Brown 
positions the complicity of their relative, Bobby Roberts, as both his 
fault and the fault of whites simultaneously:
I hate the white man who put the gun in my grandfather’s 
hands, so they could get control over Noongars, and gave him 
the chains, so he could chain them up . . . He was happy, they 
gave him leggings. But they weren’t even proper leggings, only 
half of one leg. But he was too silly to know that. (47) 
Scott is impressed by his Kayang’s capacity to “confront, rather than 
avoid unpleasant facts” (48) when he admits, “I’d prefer all my ances-
tors to be heroes” (81). He points out that “it’s a problem for us: what 
to make of such an ancestor?” (48). Scott takes the opportunity to think 
through his ancestor as “brutal, opportunistic,” “isolated and fearful” 
with “no alternative to cooperation” (53) and as someone who “saw 
himself as their equal” (53) with an “appreciation of innovation and 
strategic thinking” (54). Taking account of Bobby Robert’s complicity 
operates here as a way of understanding not only Scott and Brown’s dif-
ferent relationships to the past but also complicity as a part of coloni-
alism: “I think indigenous experience can encompass both pride and 
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shame, and can even include complicity in processes of colonisation” 
(Scott and Brown 208). Moreton-Robinson’s work also indicates the si-
multaneous, but diff erently weighted “resilience, creativity and strength 
of Indigenous women and the continuity of colonialism in discursive 
and cultural practices” (31 emphasis added).
Scott’s understanding of complicity in colonization raises the question 
of the conditions necessary for complicity to be admitted, spoken of. To 
raise the issue of complicity raises the spectre of disloyalty, not only that 
of the ancestors. For white readers, Aboriginal complicity in this context 
might be read as compromise, shared history, and even a welcome point 
of commonality. But it is just as likely to be an invitation to “decolonise 
the mind” (Brady and Carey 270). In Scott’s account, the recognition of 
complicity with whites is precisely not an invitation to share this history 
as a point of commonality: “after a shared history overwhelmingly char-
acterised by the damage done to Indigenous people and to the land, I 
don’t think it’s right to suddenly talk sharing and caring” (257). Instead, 
the ramifi cations of this “shared history” that includes complicity is to 
call for “some sort of ‘gap’ between indigenous and non-indigenous so-
cieties, a moratorium, a time of exclusion to allow communities to con-
solidate their heritages” (258). Scott clearly points out that complicity, 
though forming part of that “shared history” is not the grounds for more 
“sharing and caring” but rather a condition for separation. 
Grenville’s approach to white complicity in  e Secret River supports 
this.  e novel suggests that white complicity manifests in a kind of 
caring-and-sharing humanitarianism that is also a pointed reminder 
of ongoing complicity. In the years after the massacre, Sal attempts to 
“look after” one of the survivors of the massacre, Jack, a witness and a 
victim of the shootings. Sal gives him food, old clothes and a “patch 
of ground for him, fenced it nicely, and gave him tools and a bag of 
seed” (327). Grenville writes, “Sal had taken him [Jack] on as something 
of a project. A penance, it had occurred to  ornhill” (327). Jack re-
jects their off erings. A “civilising” project is “penance” in the  ornhill’s 
terms. But penance does not include a recognition of Jack’s claims to the 
land “ is me, he said, My Place” (329 emphasis original). If responsi-
bility is assessed in Jack’s terms as his claims to the land, to sovereignty, 
78
Fi ona  Proby n - R a p s ey
then Sal and  ornton’s humanitarianism, where they share food and 
clothes and give him a patch of ground to farm, constitutes their on-
going complicity. Here the living together, the sharing and caring in 
relation to patch of ground, food and clothes, dramatizes incommensu-
rability in proximity.
While in this essay I bring Grenville’s work and Scott’s work together, 
I do not do so in order to suggest that they and the histories they write 
are joined by complicity but that complicity also stands between them. 
Complicity demonstrates that we are circumscribed in attempts to do 
justice to all Others, and yet awareness of complicity also adheres at 
the centre of the desire to do justice. While I have pointed out that the 
thing about complicity is that it points to a critic’s proximity to colo-
nialism rather than separation from it, this is not to say that therefore 
the critic gains proximity to all Others through her/their mutually reg-
istered complicity in colonialism.  ey may well be further separated by 
it, rather than joined together in a kind of community of the complic-
it.  is follows Ahmed’s discussion of an “ethical communication” that 
necessitates “a certain way of holding proximity and distance together: 
one gets close enough to others to be touched by that which cannot be 
simply got across” (157). 
Complicity operates in these cultural texts to structure a relationship 
to the past that connects with the present. Complicity functions diff er-
ently to guilt in that it has a diff erent relationship to history and teleolo-
gies of progress. Again, Derrida’s work is useful to contextualize this, 
as well as Wendy Brown’s account of hauntology in relation to politics 
without history, without conviction. In Spectres of Marx, Derrida re-
minds us that the spectre appears at the death or the end of something, 
to remind us of its ongoing presence (4). Rather than being scared of 
ghosts, Derrida harnesses their potential in terms of hauntology—the 
thing that represents the demise of something also signals its continua-
tion in a diff erent form. Complicity articulates such a phenomenon; the 
failure of expiation and guilt to do justice to the structure of colonialism 
and the limited guarantees of critique. Complicity takes on a spectral 
presence reminding us of links with the past and the present and re-
sponsibility to the future. Complicity, like hauntology, can in this sense 
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be described as a methodology. Wendy Brown describes hauntology in 
the following terms:
 e phenomenon remains alive, refusing to recede into the 
past, precisely to the extent that its meaning is open and am-
biguous . . . To be haunted by something is to feel ourselves dis-
quieted or disoriented by it, even if we cannot name or conquer 
its challenge.  us logic of haunting is thus a logic in which 
there is permanent open-endedness of meaning and limits of 
mastery. Paradoxically, these features of haunting will turn out 
to constitute the site of intellectual and political agency within 
‘hauntology.’ (152–53)
 e capacity of complicity to disorient and unsettle also constitutes its 
political agency. 
Complicity can disable oppositional conviction oriented critique be-
cause of the complex interrelationships it brings about, the feeling of 
not being able to move because of the ramifi cations of always treading 
heavily in the problem itself, rather than stepping beyond it. Complicity 
can also drive oppositional critique, in an ongoing project to alter the 
grounds of political affi  liations with whiteness, class privileges, gender 
bias, and so forth.  e metaphor that drives this is movement itself, or, 
more specifi cally, progress; the idea that political activity has to be seen 
as progressive or to make progress in order to be valid. Brown argues that 
the loss of progress under hauntology allows a sitting still and a percola-
tion of new and alternative stories that are sometimes disavowed in the 
relentless desire to keep moving forward, away from the problem that 
has been identifi ed. Taking stock of Nietzsche’s statement that “convic-
tions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies” (483), Brown takes 
issue with the rise of conviction in place of the loss of reason. She writes, 
“transcendent ideals in politics—convictions—are, precisely refusals to 
allow history and contingency to contour the existing dimensions and 
possibilities of political life. In this sense they constitute repudiation of 
politics, even as they masquerade as its source of redemption” (94). As 
a methodology, complicity does not assume that the “solution” will also 
not come up with a whole host of problems. Complicity suggests that 
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critical and cultural horizons are not settled (Probyn-Rapsey n.pag.). 
In postcolonial feminist terms this means that, “the future is a ques-
tion mark and a mark of questioning” (Ahmed 183). In contemporary 
Australian culture, the future of shared histories and reconciliation also 
remains a question mark and a mark of questioning that is motivated by 
the spectre of complicity. 
Notes
 1  anks to Charles McPhedran for research assistance.  anks also to Charles 
McPhedran, Ann Delandes, Adam Gall, Jodi Frawley, Mark Sanders, and Esther 
Berry for their comments and suggestions.  e author gratefully acknowledges 
the support provided by a Research and Development grant from the University 
of Sydney, Australia.
 2 See also Drucker for her discussion of the ways that contemporary art admits 
its complicity with popular culture and in doing so bypasses or imbibes much 
modernist art criticism. 
 3 See Mulgan, Gaita, Augustinos and LaCouteur, Williams, and Probyn.
 4 See Goot and Rowse.
 5 Historian Geoff rey Blainey is credited with introducing the term “black arm-
band” in 1993. His view was subsequently taken up by PM John Howard in 
1996 and again in 1997.
 6  anks to Charles McPhedran for highlighting this link in Arendt’s work be-
tween thoughtlessness and complicity.
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